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Resumo 
 
 
A presença das mulheres nos mais diversos aspetos da vida das sociedades 
tem sofrido modificações ao longo dos anos. Com este trabalho pretende 
analisar-se o efeito da diversidade do género na rendibilidade das empresas, 
considerando para tal uma amostra de empresas portuguesas que têm uma 
importância acrescida para a economia, já que se consideram na amostra as 
empresas destacadas pela Revista Exame, na sua edição anual de 2013 como 
sendo as “500 Maiores e Melhores” empresas. Os resultados apresentam 
evidência de que a presença das mulheres nos quadros das empresas gera 
efeitos negativos no desempenho das empresas. Este resultado poderá estar 
relacionado com o grau de risco associado às decisões e políticas 
implementadas pelos quadros administrativos onde participam mulheres. De 
um modo geral, os resultados permitem concluir que a presença de mulheres 
nos quadros terá influência no funcionamento do quadro administrativo e da 
própria empresa. 
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Abstract 
 
The presence of women in various aspects of life of societies has changed 
throughout the years. This work aims to analyse the effect of gender diversity in 
the profitability of firms, considering, for such study, a sample of Portuguese firms 
that have increased importance for the economy, since we consider the 
companies highlighted by “EXAME” Magazine in its annual 2013 edition as the 
"500 Biggest and Best" companies. The results show evidence that the presence 
of women on boards of directors of the companies generates negative effects on 
firm’s performance. This result may be related to the degree of risk associated 
with the decisions and policies implemented by administrative boards where 
women participate. Overall, the results suggest that the presence of women on 
boards of directors will influence the functioning of the board of directors and the 
company itself. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
We live in a modernized world, which arises as a consequence of the phenomenon 
of globalization. As the name itself suggests, globalization has allowed many people, from 
different cultures, all over the world, to contact with each other. This contact has led the 
population to a better understanding of the world and its reality. 
This permanent contact and inter community communication also conducted to 
different opinions, and originated conflicts between these communities, originating the 
Two World Wars that we know. These two wars changed the way people lived, with men 
in the front of the combat, women occupied men’s position in daily duties. This means 
that, with the emergence of the two wars, women began to play roles that, until then, 
corresponded only to men. 
The capitalist regime started to integrate the daily life of societies, initiating a 
change of mentality with regard to women and their rights, as well as their professional 
situation, giving place to several laws concerning the integration of women in the labour 
market. 
There was, subsequently, an increase of the demand for female work force, causing 
women to invest on their educational and professional training. This concern made them, 
after a few years, a qualified and specialized work force, able to perform functions in high 
positions that became very attractive for companies all over the world. 
As a consequence of this “acquisition” to the labour market, the need to understand 
the implications of this new contribution caused several authors to dedicate their time and 
work to subjects where women would be the focus of their analysis, especially when 
women assume important positions on firm’s boards or in top management. (Hoffman & 
Maier, 1961; Carter et al., 2003; Daily& Dalton, 2003). 
Apart from being a timely and important topic, Europe has already a higher 
percentage of female population, representing about 51.2% of the population in the 27 
countries in 2011, according to information provided by the PORDATA website
1
. The 
estimated value for female population in Portugal, for 2011, is 52.2%, close to the 
European Union (EU) value. Table 1 shows some information about the European 
population. 
                                                          
1
 www.pordata.pt 
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Table 1: Resident Population in European Union and Portugal 
Year: 2011 
Gender Female 
Population (%) Total Male Female 
EU27 – European 
Union (27 Countries) 
502 642 207 245 364 573 257 277 886 51.20 
PT - Portugal 10 557 560 5 041 990 5 515 570 52.20 
Source: PORDATA 
 
Table 2 shows some information about the active population.  
 
Table 2: Active Population in European Union and Portugal 
Year: 2011 
Gender 
Female Active 
Population (%) 
Total Male Female 
EU27 – European Union 
(27 Countries) 
239 297.2 130 479.9 108 817.3 45.50 
PT - Portugal 5 543.2 2 940.5 2 602.6 47.00 
Source: PORDATA 
 
As we can see from the table, in 2011, around 45% of the EU population were 
considered active population. In Portugal, it represented, in 2011, 47% of the population, a 
value slightly higher than in the EU. 
In this study, our main objective is to know the weight of female representation on 
the boards of the 500 biggest and best Portuguese companies, highlighted by EXAME 
Magazine, as well as to understand what kind of roles women play in these companies, 
trying to analyse if they belong to common work force, or on the contrary they occupy a 
pivotal position on companies’ boards or top management. Consequently, we formulate 
three questions and try to answer them with this study:  
- What is the importance of female directors in the 500 biggest and best 
organizations used in the study?  
- Can the risk aversion of women directors affect the risk level of the firm and 
enrich the firm’s performance?  
- What characteristics of the organizations influence the presence of women on 
boards?  
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This study leads to a deeper level of investigation; therefore, we attempt to 
understand the gender influence on companies’ decisions, and how it can affect their 
outcomes and performance in a direct way. This analysis is relevant to the extent that the 
entry of women into the labour market in a more intense and active way allows the 
discussion of the role and position they hold in society, deepening and enriching the 
studies produced so far. Companies around the world continue, these days, to discuss 
issues about the diversity of ethnicity, cultural differences and the implementation of 
measures related to such problems. The diversity of gender and its implications in various 
aspects of life in society, like the issues mentioned earlier, is a current topic that deserves 
the same or more attention and lacks for analysis, discussion and implementation of 
measures. 
We find evidence that the presence of women in the organizations’ boards have a 
negative effect on the firm’s performance. This negative impact might be related to their 
risk aversion and the implementation of less risky policies. In addition, we find that the 
presence of women in the boards of directors is not influenced by the type of the main 
shareholder. Firms with less assets and a larger number of directors on the board have 
more women as directors. 
This study is organized in four main sections. In the first section we present a brief 
review on previous studies, describing the theoretical arguments. In the second part we 
present the process of data selection and the sample, as well as the description of the 
methodology we apply in the empirical analysis. In section three, we present and discuss 
the main results of the study. Finally, in the last section, we present the main conclusions. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In the first section of the study, we will carry out a brief literature review. 
Primarily, a brief contextualization using other authors’ studies, to help understanding the 
influence of boards’ composition to firms’ performance. In a second stage, we will aboard 
specifically the position women occupy in firms and try to have an idea of what are the 
implications of their role in firms’ decisions. 
 
2.1. Board’s compositions and its influence on firm performance  
  
There are countless factors that contribute to firms’ performance, and in a similar 
way to various other aspects of countries’ economy, some have more relevance and 
provide a greater contribution than others. 
Analogously, the functioning and modus operandi of companies are more related 
and dependent of some elements over several others. Thereby there are a significant 
number of studies analysing different elements that have been stipulated, by the diverse 
authors, to be more important and relevant to the society. 
With the evolution of time, society suffers transformations, implying new ways of 
living, new attitudes and new habits. With all this, the integration of women into the labour 
market has become an increasingly important topic, and consequently debated and studied. 
The companies’ boards have a direct contribute to their performance and 
consequently, to their outcomes. First, company directors are the element with greater 
power to influence corporate outcomes, since they are responsible for the making decisions 
process and implementing various strategies that will define how the company works and 
approaches the different markets. 
Over the years, we found a growing concern about the board meetings and the 
influence of their decisions on companies’ performance. Indeed in the last years, a growing 
number of studies have been done in order to analyse the influence of the boards’ 
composition / structure on the company value. 
The companies have as main objective to maximize their value and, consequently, 
the shareholders wealth, so they try to constitute their boards qualitatively to achieve this 
objective as satisfactorily as possible. And this constitution must involve at least a 
qualitative idea about the trade-offs of demographic diversity. 
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As mentioned before, and bearing in mind that companies want to maximize its 
value, the boards are build-up of directors to answer two important functions for 
companies: monitor and provide resources. 
The natural evolution of societies causes the appearance of new concepts, one 
regards companies’ workforce. The capital of the board is connected with two important 
functions of boards in organisations: the provision of resources and monitoring. The 
elements of board capital can be perceived as experience, skills and connections to 
organizations of strategic importance. These elements, that are the most likely to facilitate 
the provision of resources, also facilitate monitoring, suggesting that best practices for 
board composition emphasizing board capital will positively influence both board 
functions (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
However, with the prospect of the agency theory, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue 
that the incentives of boards only affect monitoring and suggest that both provision of 
resources and monitoring are limited to the capital of the board. 
It is also important to relate the diversity of boards with its size and try to 
understand its impact on firms’ outcomes, or in other words understand what kind of 
effects board size and diversity have on firm performance. Through the literature, it is 
possible to find evidence that board diversity may represent a significant limitation to the 
changing strategies (e.g., Goldstein, Gautam & Baker, 2006). 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) also analysed the differences in performance of 
companies caused by the board composition and size. Studying the same problem, Klein 
(1998) used the structure of the boards (committees) and the role played by directors of 
companies in these committees. Hermalin and Weisbach find evidence that board’s 
composition is not related to the company’s performance, that size has a negative relation 
to the firm’s performance and that both board’s composition and size are related to more 
qualitatively decisions. Klein finds a positive relation between the percentage of inside 
directors on finance and investment committees on accounting and stock market 
performance measures and also that firms significantly increasing inside director 
representation on these two committees (finance and investment) experience significantly 
higher contemporaneous stock returns and return on investments than firms decreasing the 
percentage of inside directors on these committees. 
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Ferreira (2010) presents several advantages and disadvantages of diversity in 
boards. Like other authors, Ferreira admits that people with different life experiences 
originate creativity and diversity of perspectives to analyse problems. This diversity makes 
available to the company several resources, if the company has the ability to understand 
these differences and take advantage of the different characteristics of their workers. 
However, Ferreira points out that this diversity may generate some conflicts, lack of 
cooperation and may hinder communication, reducing interpersonal attraction. It may be 
possible that companies select managers with little experience and appropriate 
qualifications and thus overlook characteristics that may have influence on firm’s 
performance. 
As mentioned above, there are many variables that can be studied to investigate the 
diversity of companies’ boards, therefore there are also many authors writing about the 
subject, making the literature extensive. 
The gender composition of teams may be an influence on gender performance gap. 
This relationship is analysable through experiments with wages based on the team 
performance or on the outcome of a competition between teams. Being possible to find 
evidence that in an environment without gender diversity, introducing gender diversity 
increases the gender performance gap regarding the wages based on team performance and 
decreases the gap relative to competition between teams. Indicating a tendency for the 
existence of a “tension” between the objective to maximize performance and minimize 
gender inequality and its consequences (Ivanova-Stenzel & Kübler, 2005). 
According to some of the authors cited above, such as Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) and Klein (1998), it is possible to relate the diversity of groups to their companies’ 
outcomes. This combination leads to positive outcomes, contributing to higher quality 
decisions with group thinking in a more complex, complete and near reality way 
(Morrison, 1992). There are, however, other types of relations and influences that can be 
caused by group diversity. Robinson and Dechant (1997) analyse the relationship between 
team diversity and the market penetration of firms, finding that diversity enables 
companies to better and easier penetration in various markets. In addition, the authors 
conclude that diversity has a positive relationship with creativity and innovation. With 
more diverse groups there is a greater number of alternative perspectives encouraging / 
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reinforcing problem solving. Thus, it suggests that diversity can present itself a positive 
factor for the company’s outcomes. 
Another perspective involves the value individuals attach to diversity. According to 
Haslam, Platow and Van Knippenberg (2007), it is possible to associate the work group 
diversity and group identification and observe that the more individuals believe in the 
value of diversity, the higher is the positive relation between them. 
According to Hambrick, Seung Cho and Chen (1996), the diversity of groups of 
companies in terms of functional backgrounds, which occurs at the level of experience, 
education and company ownership, are more likely to act competitively, providing answers 
and actions of significant magnitude. However heterogeneous teams are slower in their 
actions and responses and are less likely to respond to the initiatives of their competitors. 
The diversity of boards may be examined, as previously mentioned, using different 
variables. For example, Giuliano, Levine and Leonard (2006) examine the diversity based 
on differences in ethnicity, age and gender between managers and subordinates. These 
authors find that the differences have a statistically significant result and may have major 
adverse effects on employment. 
Analysing the banking industry, Hagendorff (2012) find that positive returns for 
announcements of mergers approved by the board members diverse in terms of training, 
age and detention are associated with wealth losses during the acquisition announcement 
and gender diversity not leads to a measurable effect. 
Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) provide the first empirical evidence that is 
dedicated to the relationship between the diversity of boards and the improved financial 
value, concluding that there is a positive relationship between the fraction of women or 
minorities on boards of companies and their value. In addition, the authors conclude that 
the proportion of women or minorities in the boards increases with firm and board size, but 
decrease as the number of insiders increases. 
A question that becomes essential to answer is to realize the type of relation 
between the board of directors and its constitution as well as the value they create for the 
company. 
This connection can be explored by examining the relationship between 
demographic diversity on boards of directors and the companies’ performance. Defining as 
indicators of company performance the return on assets and investment to measure the 
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financial performance and connecting them with the percentage of women and minorities 
on the boards of directors, Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003) find a positive relationship 
between diversity and company performance. 
In general, the analysis and studies dedicated to this topic are concerned with the 
relation between the diversity of gender or ethnicity and the companies’ performance. 
However, it is still possible to identify two reasons that justify the relation between boards’ 
diversity and companies’ performance, which are the companies’ reputation and 
innovation. A greater diversity in the boards has a positive influence on both reputation 
and innovation, and both have a significant contribution to the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and firm performance and, finally, greater gender diversity results in greater scale 
innovation (Miller & Triana, 2009). 
Shukeri, Shin and Shaari (2012) analyse a sample of Malaysian companies, 
identifying some characteristics of board meetings as fundamental elements to firms’ 
performance. The board size and ethnic diversity have a positive relationship with the 
return on equity (a measure of financial performance of the company) and the 
independence of the board has a negative relationship. Unlike the results of several studies 
in many other countries, in Malaysian companies, managerial ownership, the duality of the 
CEOs and gender diversity do not have a significant impact on company’s performance. 
Hoffman and Maier (1961) try to understand the effect of the diversity of boards in 
the quality of decisions that companies make, but try to analyse this diversity as to the 
value of the groups or the attitudes they take and their contribution to the outcomes. This 
study in particular, stands out because even creating problems that create emotional 
conflict, the more heterogeneous a group is, the higher quality and efficiency in solving 
problems they may have, which only reinforces previous research of Hoffman. 
Cox, Lobel and McLeod (1991) affirm that diversity allows us to understand 
human transactions, there are some elements that are not comparable, however, others, 
such as age, the role that the individual plays in his work and religion, are comparable and 
changeable. They combine the results of certain businesses effects of cultural diversity and 
relate them to the physical and cultural identities of the members of the organizations. 
In their study, Cox, Lobel and McLeod (1991) examine board diversity as a factor 
of company performance, identifying two effects that influence the efficiency of 
organizations. Diversity promotes differentiation within the company and therefore 
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stimulates the diversification of companies’ strategies, making companies stand out in the 
market and in marketing. Companies experience higher levels of innovation and creativity, 
which allow for a greater and a faster response to problems, having greater flexibility. 
According to these authors, it is possible to obtain benefits from diversity, because it 
attracts qualified and more talented work force. 
Thus, cultural diversity can generally strengthen and encourage team work (Ely and 
Thomas, 2001). 
This cultural diversity originates heterogeneous groups that are a potential 
advantage for companies, as they have the possibility to consider more alternatives to 
strategize and solve problems (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miller, 2009). 
This whole concept of diversity comes from a previous phenomenon, migration, 
which is responsible for cultural interaction, leading to a learning globalised process. 
However there is a negative effect on the employment level of the company with an 
increasing cultural diversity (Brunow & Blien, 2011). 
The functional diversity of ownership and diversity of the company influence, 
directly and through their effects on the processes of internal and external communication, 
the companies’ performance. 
However, despite diversity produces processes that make possible the performance 
of the company, the direct negative effects of diversity on the company's performance 
outweigh the indirect positive effects of the processes carried out by groups (Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992). 
These studies have been focused on large companies. There is, therefore, a more 
extensive literature in this field. In this sense, this study tends to add some information to 
those studies that have been carried out so far. Besides concentrate on large firms this 
analysis includes the biggest firms and the companies with the best sailing rates. 
 
 
2.2. The impact of women’s position on firm’s decisions  
 
 
Diversity can be measured using several variables, such as age, ethnicity and 
nationality, but gender is a variable that has gained substantial importance in recent years. 
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Throughout this study, we intend to highlight the diversity of gender and its 
influence to the outcomes of the companies. 
Considering this, several authors have investigated the influence of the entry of 
women into the labour market and what are the consequences of having those occupying 
crucial positions in companies (Hoffman & Maier, 1961; Carter et al, 2003; Daily & 
Dalton, 2003). 
One of the main functions of the management is control, which can be achieved by 
working monitoring. This task can be affected by the composition of the companies with 
respect to gender. 
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2010) analyse a sample of Spanish Small and 
Medium Size firms (SME), a country with a history unfavourable to women, and have 
studied the impact of the gender composition of SMEs on Spanish boards of directors. The 
authors found that women’s presence on boards generates a negative impact on firm 
performance and this result may be due to less risky strategies implemented by women 
directors. The bigger decision-making capacity of women on boards of SMEs can lead to 
the adoption of less risky policies and have a negative effect on firm performance. 
Some years later, Mínguez-Vera and Martin (2011) analyse the gender diversity of 
a sample of Spanish SME, and conclude that women’s presence on boards has a negative 
impact on firm performance. They also find evidence that family firms and firms with a 
financial institution as the main shareholder tend to have more women on their boards. 
Finally, they realize that firms with less debt, more assets and larger boards have more 
women as directors. 
In the case of Swedish companies, the diversity of the gender has a negative impact 
on returns on total assets of the companies after two years. They find that board size is 
negatively related to firm performance, supporting theories that more gender diverse 
boards are associated with costs (e.g., conflicts, slower decision-making) which reduce 
profitability (Daunfeldt & Rudholm, 2012). 
A more gender-diversified board might lead to a better understanding of markets 
that are themselves diversified in terms of gender; might increase firm creativity and 
innovativeness; might improve the decision-making as more alternatives and their 
consequences are evaluated; might have a positive effect on consumer behaviour by 
improving the image of the firm; and might have positive dynamic effects by improving 
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the career opportunities of women, thereby increasing the quality of candidates for top 
positions in the future (Daunfeldt & Rudholm, 2012). 
It is important to understand the presence of women on the board and how they, 
playing a role as Director, recognize the dynamics of board meetings. There are some 
differences between male and female perception, concerning the group dynamic. Women 
who have non-traditional educational experiences can have a more negative perception 
than other female directors. However, the differences on education and training are 
reducing drastically, nowadays. Therefore, there is evidence of a positive relationship 
between the presence of women on boards and their perception of companies’ dynamics 
(Mathisen, Ogaard & Marnburg, 2012). 
There is, however, another approach with regard to this perception by women. 
Elstad and Ladegard (2010) study sample of Norwegian companies. The authors examine 
to what degree women perceive that they contribute to the decisions on corporate boards, 
and to what extent this perceived contribution of each woman increases when the ratio of 
women increases on the board. The results show that the higher the ratio of women, the 
greater the level of perceived influence, perceived social interaction outside the 
boardroom, and to some degree, perceived information sharing. Women have a greater 
ability to share information, a low level of self-censoring and higher ability to influence the 
different members of the board. 
Desvaux, Devillard-Hoellinger and Baumgarten (2007) highlight the role of women 
in business and present a study that reveals positive contribution, with regard to the 
relationship between women on companies’ boards and job positions of greater importance 
in the management and performance of the company. 
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3. Sample, Data and Methodology 
 
 
3.1. Sample 
 
The companies used to constitute this study sample were the 500 biggest and best 
Portuguese companies that prevail in the annual special edition of “EXAME” Magazine, 
published on December 2013. The analysts from the magazine based their choice of the 
best companies of the 27 sectors of EXAME’s 500 on the following criteria: sales 
increment; net income increment; return on assets; return on equity; sales profitability 
(measured by operating income); the relation between gross added value and net sales; 
solvability and liquidity (measured by the current ratio). With these indicators it is possible 
to assess the contribution of the organizations to the economy, to verify their dynamism, 
measure their profitability and understand the financial equilibrium. These characteristics 
are essential to the country’s economy future, achieved by the business sustainability and 
company’s prevalence.  
Consequently, our sample consists of 500 non-financial organizations for the year 
of 2012. Data were obtained from SABI (Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos), a 
private database provided by Bureau van Dijk. 
 
3.2. Investigation Questions 
 
To carry out the analysis and obtain the results, the study is divided in parts, and 
three models will be used, to answer three questions, that constitute the study objective: 
-  “What is the effect of the presence of female directors in the 500 biggest and 
best organizations in their performance?”.  
This question will relate the women’s presence on the boards to the firms’ 
performance, and help to understand the impact of their presence to the firms’ 
performance; 
- “Can the risk aversion of women directors affect the risk level of firm and 
enrich the firm’s performance?”.  
The second question relates the women’s presence on firms’ board and the 
firms’ risk. We will try to relate the results to the firm’s performance and try to 
have some justification for the results; 
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- “What characteristics of the organizations influence the presence of women on 
boards?”  
The last question helps to shed light on some characteristics that can benefit the 
presence of women on the boards of directors. 
 
3.3.  Dependent Variables 
 
This study is based on three models that hold, as dependent variables the following 
variables: 
The firm’s performance, measured as the return on equity (ROE). This variable is 
used in the first model to help determining the relationship between female board 
membership and firm performance.  
The firms’ risk (RISK), measured as the logarithm of the variability of ROE 5 years 
before, to relate the women’s presence on boards with the risk. 
The last model uses as dependent variable WOMEN, which includes a measure of 
women’s presence on the board of directors, PWOMEN and DWOMAN. PWOMEN is the 
percentage of women on the board and DWOMAN is a dummy variable that takes the 
value one when at least one woman is present on the board, and zero otherwise. 
 
3.4.  Independent and Control Variables 
 
For the first two models, we define several independent variables, as proxies for the 
gender diversity of the board of directors: the variable DIVERSITY that includes, 
alternatively, the variables PWOMEN and DWOMAN, as defined before. 
However, it is argued that these variables are not enough to measure diversity 
(Ancona & Caldwell, 1992). Consequently, we consider two additional measures of gender 
diversity. The number of gender categories (two) – Variety and the evenness of the 
distribution of board members among the two gender categories, denominated as Balance. 
It is possible to combine into ‘dual concept’ these measures of diversity (Stirling, 1998). 
The first is the BLAU Index (Blau, 1977), which is calculated as1 − ∑ Pi
2n
i=1 , where Pi is 
the percentage of board members in each category and n is the total number of board 
members. This index for gender diversity range from 0 to 0.5, which occurs when the 
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board is composed of an equal number of men and women. The second measure is the 
SHANNON Index (Shannon, 1948), obtained as− ∑ PilnPi
n
i=1 , which variables have 
already been defined before in the Blau Index. This measure varies between 0 and 0.69, 
once more when we have an equal proportion of men and women in the board. These 
second measure yields a larger number than the Blau index and is more sensitive to small 
differences in the gender composition of boards, because it measures diversity through the 
logarithm. 
For the third and last model, we consider an independent variable that indicates the 
type of the main shareholder (MAIN), defined by the following dummy variables: FAM, 
that takes the value one if the main shareholder is a family member, and zero otherwise; 
FIN that takes the value one if the main shareholder is a financial institution, and zero 
otherwise, and FNIN, that takes the value one if the main shareholder is a non financial 
institution, and zero otherwise.  
Besides these variables, we consider the following control variables (CV): the level 
of debt (LEV), calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets, the firm age (AGE), 
calculated as the logarithm of the age of the firm, the number of employees (EMP), 
computed as the logarithm of the employees’ number, the number of directors (NDI), 
considering the logarithm of the number of directors, and finally the total assets (AS), as 
the logarithm of total assets. Many of these variables have already been used in previous 
studies (e.g., Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Carter et al., 2003). 
 
3.5.  Methodology 
 
In this section, we present the econometric models, for the linear regression we will 
estimate, using the least square method to estimate the regressions. The methodology 
applied is based on the study of Mínguez-Vera and Martin (2011).  
Model one was estimated to analyse the nature of the relationship between female 
board membership and firm performance, being expressed as follow: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑖
4
𝐽=2
+ 𝜇𝑖                                                                     (1) 
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The variable DIVERSITY includes, alternatively, the percentage of women on the 
board of directors, PWOMEN, and the dummy variable, DWOMEN, previously defined. 
CV represents the control variables (LEV, AGE and EMP). The expression μirefers to the 
disturbance, or error. 
Model two tests if boards with more gender diversity choose less risky strategies, 
based on the following regression model: 
𝐿𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑖
4
𝐽=2
+ 𝜇 𝑖                                                                (2) 
 
The variable RISK represents the firms’ risk, as defined before. The DIVERSITY 
and CV as defined for model one. 
The last model is estimated to find out the determinants of firm diversity, using 
ROE, RISK MAIN, which represents the main shareholder and CV, as independent 
variables, to explain the dependent variable, WOMEN, measured by PWOMEN and 
DWOMAN. The regression model is represented as: 
 
𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑗𝑖
4
𝐽=3
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑖
8
𝐽=5
+ 𝜇 𝑖                    (3) 
 
Taking into account the perspective of this study, as well as the sample, it is 
expected a positive effect of gender diversity on firm performance. It is only logical to 
think that in this kind of organizations, with big dimension and with the best results 
presented, the decisions made by the board of directors have great influence on the firm 
functioning and performance and the presence of women imply different ways of thinking 
and solving issues, consequently implementing strategic decisions. 
Considering the control variables, a negative sign is expected for the variable LEV, 
if the level of debt is used as a reinforcing mechanism for the managers. It is also expected 
a negative sign for AGE and EMP variables, because we expect firms that are operating on 
the market for longer, will see their performance diminished and the more employees a 
firm has, the more expenses with employees the firm has, which has a negative effect on 
their performance. 
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The companies we are considering are known for their singular characteristics. 
Therefore, we expect a positive effect for gender diversity on firms’ risk. We expect that 
firms that present this kind of results prevail in the market due to their less risky strategies 
and policies implemented. The expected signs for the control variables are the same as in 
the first model. 
The vision of the labour market has undergone major changes with the entry of 
women as active and contributory element to the economy of the countries. There has been 
a natural evolution in the performance of functions since their integration into the working 
world. As far as it concerns companies’ administration boards, we are witnessing every 
passing to a greater presence of women playing roles in positions of greater importance. 
However, mentalities are still changing and, therefore, women are still a scarce commodity 
in the companies’ boards. And if they are still insufficient, they may choose to serve on the 
boards of better performing firms. We expect a positive relationship between firm 
performance and women presence on the board. Also a positive sign is expected for the 
relationship between the presence of women on boards and the firms’ risk. Finally it is 
expectable that firms that have as main shareholder a family member would have more 
women on the firm’s boards, for family reasons. Also firms with more assets and age will 
have more women on the board. 
To allow us to have a perspective of our variables, we present in table 3 the 
descriptive statistics for all the variables we included in the analysis. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ROE 15.7062 13.3050 70.0530 -548.9000 655.9500 
RISK 0.2315 0.0935 1.4702 -3.7250 6.6636 
PWOMEN 0.1804 0.1667 0.1593 0.0000 1.0000 
DWOMAN 0.7404 1.0000 0.4389 0.0000 1.0000 
BLAU 0.2450 0.2681 0.1754 0.0000 0.5000 
SHANNON 0.3744 0.4434 0.2505 0.0000 0.6900 
LEV 67.5893 66.6400 42.359 0.4800 755.97 
AGE 1.3505 1.3424 0.3536 0.3010 2.1584 
EMP 2.3630 2.4571 0.7669 0.0000 4.3541 
FAM 0.1119 0.0000 0.3156 0.0000 1.0000 
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FIN 0.0262 0.0000 0.1599 0.0000 1.0000 
FNIN 0.8595 1.0000 0.3479 0.0000 1.0000 
AS 7.9874 7.9148 0.6316 4.9891 10.3192 
NDIR 9.0309 8.0000 5.1216 1.0000 42.0000 
NDI 0.8836 0.9031 0.2708 0.0000 1.6233 
Variables: ROE (return on equity, %), RISK (the logarithm of the variability of ROE, 5 years before), 
PWOMEN (percentage of women on the board of directors), DWOMAN (binary variable that takes a value 
of 1 when there is at least one woman on the board of directors, and 0 otherwise), BLAU (Blau index of 
diversity), SHANNON (Shannon index of diversity), LEV (total debt over total assets), AGE (logarithm of 
firm age), EMP (logarithm of number of employees of the firm), FAM (binary variable that takes a value of 1 
when the major shareholder is a family member, and 0 otherwise), FIN (binary variable that takes a value of 
1 when the major shareholder is a financial institution, and 0 otherwise), FOU (binary variable that takes a 
value of 1when the major shareholder is a foundation, and 0 otherwise), AS (logarithm of the book value of 
the total assets of the firm), NDIR (number of directors on the board), NDI (logarithm of the number of 
directors on the board), NDIR (logarithm of the number of directors on the board). 
 
As we can see, about 74% of the sample companies have one or more women on 
their boards. However, the mean percentage of women on the boards of these companies 
has a low value, of approximately 18%. This fact may be indicator that women do in fact 
have a high presence on the firms’ boards, but they are in such a low proportion to men, 
that their opinion may be neglected when it comes to the boards decisions. Mínguez-Vera 
and Martin (2011) find the percentages of 23% and 11.3% for the variables DWOMAN 
and DWOMEN, respectively. 
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4. Empirical Results 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the regression (1), reflecting the effect of the gender 
diversity, measured by DWOMAN, women’s presence and PWOMEN, percentage of 
women on boards of directors, on firm’s performance. The results are presented for a 
sample that eliminated the outliers that can bias the analysis. 
 
Table 4: Least Squares regression of the influence of women’s presence on boards of directors and 
diversity indexes on the  firm performance (ROE) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Prob. 
Panel A: Women presence 
Constant 47.2219 9.0217 0.0000 
DWOMAN -13.1711 5.9277 0.0268 
PWOMEN 37.4569 15.5517 0.0164 
LEV 1.41E-05 0.0452 0.9998 
AGE -12.7529 5.4621 0.0200 
EMP -4.4688 2.5348 0.0786 
Sample: 1 500 IF ROE<200 AND ROE>-200 
N 428   
R-squared 0.0466  16.8423 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0011   
Panel B: Diversity indexes 
Constant 48.5166 8.9503 0.0000 
BLAU 266.4526 90.7702 0.0035 
SHANNON -181.2389 63.6341 0.0046 
LEV -0.0012 0.0451 0.9802 
AGE -13.5472 5.4487 0.0133 
EMP -4.6789 2.5263 0.0647 
Sample: 1 500 IF ROE<200 AND ROE>-200 
N 428   
R-squared 0.0519  16.8423 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0004   
Variables: ROE (return on equity, %), RISK (the logarithm of the variability of ROE, 5 years before), 
PWOMEN (percentage of women on the board of directors), DWOMAN (binary variable that takes a value of 1 
when there is at least one woman on the board of directors, and 0 otherwise), BLAU (Blau index of diversity), 
SHANNON (Shannon index of diversity), LEV (total debt over total assets), AGE (logarithm of firm age), EMP 
(logarithm of number of employees of the firm). 
 
We find a negative and significant effect of the presence of women on boards on 
firm’s performance, ROE. This negative effect is reinforced by the sign and significance of 
the variable PWOMEN, because their decisions on boards have less weight, since the 
proportion of women on boards is very low. As they are outnumbered by men’s presence 
on boards, their opinion might be neglected on firm’s performance, ROE. 
Considering the control variables, we note that the coefficient on LEV is not 
statistically significant, having no effect on firm’s performance. In what concerns the 
variables AGE and EMP, we find a negative and significant effect on firm’s performance. 
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The second estimation (Panel B) is very similar to the previous analysis. Using the 
Blau and Shannon indexes, we note that the negative effect of women’s presence on the 
firm’s board of directors on the firm’s performance is reinforced. The control variables 
present the same signs as the previous estimation.  
These results are consistent with previous evidence found by Cox et al. (1991), 
Watson et al. (1993), Miller et al. (1998), Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler (2005), Goldstein, 
Gautam and Baker (2006), Giuliano, Leonard and Levine (2006), Mínguez-Vera and 
Martin (2011), among other authors, that find evidence of a negative effect of women’s 
presence on the board of directors on the firms performance. 
These results help us to answer the first question placed: What is the importance of 
female directors in the 500 biggest and best organizations’ performance?” the answer 
considering our sample and regarding our results is, according to what we were expecting: 
gender diversity has a negative impact on firm’s performance. Much can be explained if 
we consider the descriptive statistics presented before. The proportion of women on boards 
is low, which makes us believe that women opinion has low influence on the decisions 
board make. Other possible reason is related to the risk aversion of women. We assumed 
that risk aversion might have influence on women that have a position on organizations’ 
boards, and implement less risky strategies can be responsible for the reduction of firm 
performance. Indeed, Bogan and Just (2013) find evidence that male presence on the firms’ 
decision teams increases the profitability of selecting a higher risk investment. 
Table 5 shows the results of regression (2), reflecting the effect of the gender 
diversity on the firm’s risk.  
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Table 5: Least Squares regression of the influence of women’s presence on boards of directors and 
diversity indexes on the  firm risk (RISK) 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error Prob. 
Panel A: Women presence 
Constant 0.0716 0.2529 0.7774 
DWOMAN 0.0211 0.1598 0.8949 
PWOMEN -1.0033 0.4131 0.0156 
LEV 0.0019 0.0011 0.0960 
AGE -0.1561 0.1570 0.3208 
EMP 0.0654 0.0687 0.3419 
Sample: 1 500 IF LRISK<2 AND LRISK>-2 
N 362   
R-squared 0.0393  -0.0284 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0136   
Panel B: diversity indexes 
Constant 0.0285 0.2530 0.9104 
BLAU -2.5608 2.4449 0.2956 
SHANNON 1.2930 1.7220 0.4532 
LEV 0.0019 0.0011 0.0945 
AGE -0.1509 0.1573 0.3381 
EMP 0.0699 0.0690 0.3119 
Sample: 1 500 IF LRISK<2 AND LRISK>-2 
N 362   
R-squared 0.0316  -0.0284 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.0427   
Variables: ROE (return on equity, %), RISK (the logarithm of the variability of ROE, 5 years before), 
PWOMEN (percentage of women on the board of directors), DWOMAN (binary variable that takes a value of 1 
when there is at least one woman on the board of directors, and 0 otherwise), BLAU (Blau index of diversity), 
SHANNON (Shannon index of diversity), LEV (total debt over total assets), AGE (logarithm of firm age), EMP 
(logarithm of number of employees of the firm). 
 
We can observe that women’s presence on organizations’ boards on firm’s risk has 
a non significant effect, which is reinforced by the descriptive statistics presented before, 
because there are a large percentage of firms that have women on their board of directors. 
However, as they are in a low proportion compared to the proportion of men, their opinion, 
or risk aversion has no significant impact on the firm’s risk. For a level of 10% of 
significance, we find that the level of debt of the firm has a positive and significant effect 
on firm’s risk. This evidence is consistent with the arguments of Ancona and Caldwell 
(1992), Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2010) and Daunfeldt & Rudholm (2012), 
highlighting the negative impact of the presence of women on the boards of directors on 
the firms’ risk, causing lower performances. 
Finally, the last model is presented in table 6, where we can find the determinants 
of women’s presence on their boards. The last analysis was driven to try to understand the 
characteristics of companies allow a larger presence of women, not only in the companies, 
29 
 
but specially the characteristics that are more favourable for women’s presence on board of 
directors. 
 
Table 6: Least Squares regression of the determinant of women’s presence on the board of 
directors 
 PWOMEN  DWOMAN 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob.  Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
Constant 0.7539 0.1897 0.0001  1.0568 0.4978 0.0343 
ROE 0.0001 0.0002 0.5904  -0.0006 0.0005 0.3090 
RISK --0.0174 0.0055 0.0017  -0.0413 0.0144 0.0044 
FAM -0.4528 0.1580 0.0044  -0.4326 0.4146 0.2974 
FIN -0.3840 0.1625 0.0186  -0.2671 0.4265 0.5315 
FNIN -0.4801 0.1565 0.0023  -0.4557 0.4106 0.2678 
LEV 3.86E-05 0.0002 0.8298  0.0003 0.0005 0.5963 
AS -0.0286 0.0141 0.0429  -0.0811 0.0369 0.0284 
NDI 0.0479 0.0344 0.1649  0.6692 0.0902 0.0000 
AGE 0.0598 0.0233 0.0104  0.1318 0.0610 0.0313 
Sample: 1 500 IF ROE<200 AND ROE>-200 
N 422    422   
R-squared 0.0832  0.1765  0.1922  0.7228 
Prob (F-
statistic) 
0.0000   
 
0.0000   
Variables: ROE (return on equity, %), RISK (logarithm of the variability of ROE relative to the 
year before), LEV (total debt over total assets), AGE (logarithm of firm age), EMP (logarithm of 
number of employees of the firm), FAM (binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the major 
shareholder is a family member, and 0 otherwise), FIN (binary variable that takes a value of 1 
when the major shareholder is a financial institution, and 0 otherwise), FOU (binary variable that 
takes a value of 1when the major shareholder is a foundation, and 0 otherwise), AS (logarithm of 
the book value of the total assets of the firm), NDIR (number of directors on the board), NDI 
(logarithm of the number of directors on the board), NDIR (logarithm of the number of directors 
on the board). 
 
According to the results presented on table 6, the impact of firms’ performance 
(ROE) on the presence of women in the boards is not statistically significant, which 
suggests that women do no choose to serve in firms with better levels of performance. 
However, we find a negative and significant effect of the firm’s risk on the presence of 
women, which may be evidence that women do prefer firms with less levels of risk. As for 
the main shareholder, we find evidence that having financial or nonfinancial institutions or 
family member as a main shareholder is prejudicial for women’s presence on the boards. 
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We also find evidence of a negative relationship between firms total assets and women on 
their boards as well as that firms with a larger number of directors and older will have 
more women on their boards. 
It is possible to understand that the fact that the major shareholder being a family 
member, or a financial or nonfinancial institution have negative effects on the presence of 
women on boards of companies with characteristics similar to our sample, as mentioned 
before:”...sales increment; net income increment; return on assets; return on equity; sales 
profitability measured by operating income; relation between gross added value and net 
sales; solvability and liquidity.”. This fact might be a good sign, revealing that women 
obtain such important positions through their work and effort, and see this work 
recognized. The total assets have a negative and significant effect and the number of 
directors has a positive and significant effect on women’s presence, on the boards of the 
companies. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
 
Nowadays, the labour market is more and more competitive and organizations have 
to struggle to survive in this environment. Women play each day more important roles in 
the economy of countries. This fact makes necessary the comprehension of the impact of 
women, in society. 
In this context, this study analysed the impact of the gender diversity on boards of 
directors, considering a sample of 500 biggest and best Portuguese organizations selected 
by the EXAME magazine, in their special annual edition, from 2013. The criteria for the 
selection of companies, allow us to evaluate the contribution of these organisations for the 
economy, to understand their dynamism, measure their profitability and understand their 
financial equilibrium, which is determinant to guarantee the firms’ future sustainability. 
For this analysis, the impact of the presence of women on board of directors on 
firms’ performance and risk and the determinants for their presence on the boards was 
measured by several variables, using a least square estimation. 
The study reveals its importance, because it uses the biggest and best Portuguese 
companies, which means that the organisations used in the sample already represent great 
source of profitability, employment, etc for the economy. They are large firms, which 
means the board’s decisions are fundamental for their performance and the presence of 
women on boards may have influence in their functioning.  
Overall, the results show evidence that the presence of women on companies’ 
boards has a negative effect on firm performance. We conclude that the reduction on firm 
performance might be related to the risk aversion. Considering the percentage of women 
on boards, we find a negative impact on firm’s risk, which means that women might 
choose less risky investment policies and strategic decisions. 
This helps to attribute a position of women’s contribution for the functioning of 
companies. We find that in the actual conjecture, the presence of women on boards is not 
being enriched or favoured by the main shareholder being a family member or financial or 
non financial institution, revealing that women hold important positions in these 
organisations by their own merit. 
This study has some limitations. Once is the reduced number of observations. Thus, 
we think it will be important in the future to enlarge the period of the sample analysis. 
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Appendix I – Models and Variables description 
Model 1:  
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑖
4
𝐽=2
+ 𝜇𝑖                                                                                   (1) 
 
 
  
         
         
 
Variable name Definition 
 
return on equity - ROE Firm performance 
 
DIVERSITY:   
PWOMEN percentage of women on the board of directors 
 
DWOMAN a dummy variable that takes a value of one when one or more women are 
present on the board, and zero otherwise 
 
Blau Index 
Values of the Blau index for gender diversity range from 0 to a maximum of 
0.5 
which occurs when the board is comprised of an equal number of men and 
women. 
 
Shannon Index 
the minimum value of the index is zero and diversity is maximized when 
both genders are present in equal proportions, which gives rise to a value of 
0.69 
 
Control variables 
      
  
 
LEV the level of debt (calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets) 
 
AGE the age of the firm 
 
EMP the logarithm of the number of employees 
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Model 2: 
𝐿𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑖
4
𝐽=2
+ 𝜇 𝑖                                                                                (2) 
 
Variable name Definition 
LRISK the logarithm of the variability of ROE 5 yearsbefore as a measure of firm risk 
DIVERSITY:                   
PWOMEN percentage of women on the board of directors 
DWOMAN a dummy variable that takes a value of one when one or more women are present 
on the board, and zero otherwise 
Blau Index 
Values of the Blau index for gender diversity range from 0 to a maximum of 0.5 
which occurs when the board is comprised of an equal number of men and 
women. 
Shannon Index the minimum value of the index is zero and diversity is maximized when both 
genders are present in equal proportions, which gives rise to a value of 0.69 
Control variables 
      
  
LEV the level of debt (calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets) 
AGE the age of the firm 
EMP the logarithm of the number of employees 
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Model 3:  
𝑊𝑂𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑀𝐴𝐼𝑁𝑗𝑖
4
𝐽=3
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝑉𝑗𝑖
8
𝐽=5
+ 𝜇 𝑖                                     (3) 
 
Variable name Definition 
WOMEN:                     
PWOMEN percentage of women on the board of directors 
DWOMAN 
a dummy variable that takes a value of one when one or more women are present 
on the board, and zero otherwise 
ROE Return on Equity 
LRISK  the logarithm of the variability of ROE 5 years before as a measure of firm risk 
Main Shareholder   
FAM 
binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the major shareholder is a family 
member, and 0 otherwise 
FIN 
binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the major shareholder is a financial 
institution, and 0 otherwise 
FNIN 
binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the major shareholder is a non 
financial institution, and 0 otherwise 
Control variables 
      
  
LEV the level of debt (calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets) 
AGE the age of the firm 
LAS logarithm of the total assets of the firm 
LNDIR the logarithm of the total number of directors 
 
